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3 NEXUS 3 (1998)
The Carefully
Orchestrated Campaign1
by Nadine Strossen2 & Caitlin Borgmann3
T he answer to thequestion, "Canpartial-birth abortions
be banned?" is an emphatic
"No." The nonmedical term,
"partial-birth abortion," is a
political chimera, with amor-
phous, shifting definitions con-
cocted by opponents of women's
reproductive rights. Because of
their vague and broad wording,
so-called "partial-birth abortion"
bans operate as virtual abortion
bans, prohibiting even the safest
and most common abortion
procedures used throughout
pregnancy. Accordingly, almost
every single judge who has ruled
on these bans - in 17 out of 18
cases to date - has enjoined
their enforcement.
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In addition to holding that
these bans impose an undue
burden on a woman's right to
choose abortion, due to their
sweeping prohibition of virtually
all abortion procedures, the
courts also have held "partial-
birth abortion" bans unconstitu-
tional for several other indepen-
dently sufficient reasons: they
violate physicians' due process
rights, since their vague termi-
nology subjects physicians to
criminal prosecution and pun-
ishment without fair notice; they
lack constitutionally required
exceptions to preserve women's
life and health; and they vest
spouses and parents with imper-
missible veto power over a
woman's right to choose.
Anti-choice activists have
performed a remarkable sleight
of hand, convincing many law-
makers, as well as much of the
media and the public, that
"partial-birth abortion" bans
Nexus
target a specific, "late-term"
abortion procedure, which they
depict in grisly terms. In thus
distorting every element of what
is actually at stake in the "par-
tial-birth abortion" debate,
opponents of women's reproduc-
tive freedom have served their
goal of diverting public atten-
tion from the pregnant woman
to the fetus.
A striking contrast is af-
forded by the courts that have
focused on the "partial-birth
abortion" bans that have been
passed in various states by
scrutinizing their language and
legislative history, and hearing
medical testimony about their
impact. Almost unanimously,
these courts have concluded that
the bans are not confined to
either a particular procedure or
a particular stage of pregnancy,
and that the bans undermine
women's health and rights
without advancing any
countervailing legitimate inter-
est in protecting potential fetal
life.5
These judicial rulings high-
light the flaws of the vague and
sweeping prohibitions as they
have been written to date. But,
even assuming that the bans
could be reformulated to target
"only" a single abortion proce-
dure and/or stage of pregnancy,
they would still be unconstitu-
tional. The practice of medicine
is both complex and fluid. One
can never rule out the possibil-
ity that a situation will arise in
which a given abortion proce-
dure will be the safest for a
specific patient in a particular
circumstance. It would be both
unconscionable and unconstitu-
tional for the government to
eliminate from a physician's
options a procedure that would
be the most medically appropri-
ate for certain patients.




abortion" is not recognized in
the medical community. More-
over, much of the rhetoric sur-
rounding the bans is wholly
unmoored from their actual
wording. For example, the bans'
proponents invoke inflammatory
imagery of fetuses late in preg-
nancy, or suctioning of fetal
skull contents. But the bans




can be banned must begin with
a careful look at the actual
wording and scope of the bans
and a review of the political
context in which they arose.
The bans to date have taken
two principal forms. The first,
which was incorporated in Con-
gress's initial "partial-birth
abortion" ban, passed in 1995
and subsequently vetoed, de-
fines a "partial-birth abortion"
as "an abortion in which the
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person performing the abortion tinually repeating a politically
partially vaginally delivers a coined term does not confer
living fetus before killing the legitimacy - medical or other-
fetus and completing the deliv- wise - on that term or on dan-
ery."6 The second formulation, gerous legislation."
which was incorporated in The chimerical nature of the
Congress's amended ban passed term "partial-birth abortion" is
in 1997 and then vetoed, retains not surprising when one consid-
the original definition of "par- ers its politically charged ori-
tial-birth abortion" as "an abor- gins. The so-called partial-birth
tion in which the person per- abortion ban is the product of a
forming the abortion partially carefully orchestrated campaign
vaginally delivers a living fetus launched by the National Right
before killing the fetus and to Life Committee (NRLC). The
completing the delivery." But, ban was contrived following a
the amended bill then defines 1992 National Abortion Federa-
that phrase to mean "deliber- tion Risk Management Seminar,
ately and intentionally delivers where a well-respected physician
into the vagina a living fetus, or and abortion provider, Dr. Mar-
a substantial portion there of, tin Haskell, gave a presentation
for the purpose of performing a on a particular abortion tech-
procedure the physician knows nique he had developed: "dila-
will kill the fetus, and kills the tion and extraction" or "D&X."
fetus."7 Neither version is lim- His monograph fell into the
ited to any particular stage of hands of anti-choice activists.
pregnancy. Thus, when propo- The NRLC first tried to use the
nents claim that the bans reach monograph to galvanize opposi-
only abortions performed late in tion to the then-pending federal
pregnancy, they mislead the Freedom of Choice Act (FOCA).
public and distort the debate. NRLC ads urging opposition to
Neither the term "partial- FOCA depicted and described "a
birth abortion" nor the two gruesome new abortion tech-
principal legislative definitions nique" called "D&X."9 Soon after
are medical in origin. Rather, FOCA's defeat, its opponents
these concepts were devised by invented the more incendiary
anti-choice activists in the mid- term, "partial-birth abortion,"
1990s, and no medical consensus along with a non medical defini-
as to their meaning has yet tion that deviated dramatically
emerged. In the words of Dr. from the description in Dr.
Ralph W. Hale, Executive Vice Haskell's monograph.
President of the American In 1997, the NRLC distrib-
College of Obstetricians and uted model language for a par-
Gynecologists (ACOG): "Con- tial-birth abortion ban to its
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state affiliates across the coun-
try. The accompanying memo-
randum prescribed certain
crucial elements, including an
approved definition of partial-
birth abortion and the omission
of an exception to preserve
women's health. The NRLC
denounced any ban that would
apply "only after "viability' or
'in the third trimester', or would
contain a health exception, as a
"phony ban." Finally, the NRLC
"strongly advise[d] against any
changes in the name of the
banned procedure or in the
definition of that procedure,"
pointing out that discussion
about the definition's scope
would serve the useful goal of
"focus[ing] the discussion on the
grisly mechanics of late-term
abortions." 10
The NRLC's memorandum
evidences a central purpose
underlying the drive for "par-
tial-birth abortion" bans: to
draw public concern to the fetus
and away from the health,
welfare, and constitutional
rights of the pregnant woman.
Concerns about fetal well-being
are elevated by referring to
fetuses as "babies." In contrast,
concerns about the pregnant
woman's well-being are deni-
grated and attacked as inher-
ently suspect by enclosing the
term "health" in quotation
marks whenever it refers to her.
H. "Partial-Birth Abortion"
in Congress and State
Legislatures
A bill embodying the con-
cocted concept of "partial-birth
abortion" was introduced in
Congress in 1995. The bill, H.R.
1833, banned all partial-birth
abortions at any stage of preg-
nancy. It contained the first
version of the definition de-
scribed above, and no exception
to preserve the woman's health,
with only a dangerously narrow
exception to preserve her life. It
also created a cause of action for
civil damages for violations of its
provisions. With certain limited
exceptions, the bill authorized
suits by the "father" of the fetus,
if married to the woman at the
time of the abortion, as well as
by "the maternal grandparents"
of the fetus, if the woman was
less than eighteen years old at
the time of the abortion. The
104th Congress passed this
unprecedented restriction on
abortion - the first time Con-
gress had outlawed any abortion
procedure - but it failed to
become law when President
Clinton vetoed it in 1996. The
President said that he could not
sign legislation that reflected
"congressional indifference to
women's health." Congress tried
to override his veto but fell a few
votes short in the Senate.
The ban was reintroduced in
Congress in 1997 as H.R. 1122.
Although it was substantially
Strossen
the same as H.R. 1833, several
amendments proposed by Sena-
tor Rick Santorum were subse-
quently adopted to garner the
endorsement of the American
Medical Association.1 With
these changes, H. R. 1122 em-
bodied the second version of the
definition described above. H.R.
1122 passed both Houses of
Congress but again was vetoed
by President Clinton. The
House voted to override the veto
but the Senate fell three votes
shy of an override on September
18, 1998. By mid-1998, 27
states had passed "partial-birth
abortion" bans, nearly all of





As noted above, almost all
courts that have considered
constitutional challenges to
these bans have concluded that
they suffer from a range of
constitutional infirmities, which
will be discussed in turn.





In the course of lawsuits
challenging the first version of
"partial-birth abortion" bans, it
became clear that the definition
- any procedure in which the
and Borgmann
physician "partially vaginally
delivers a living fetus before
killing the fetus and completing
the delivery" - does not pin-
point a single, specific abortion
technique. Rather, physicians
testified and judges found that
the definition potentially encom-
passes the safest and most
common abortion methods used
throughout pregnancy. 3 The
central problem with the defini-
tion is that it is based on deliv-
ery into the vagina. But that is
the way the vast majority of
abortions are performed. The
only non vaginal methods of
performing an abortion - hys-
terotomy and hysterectomy -
necessitate cutting through the
abdomen. 14 These methods
pose such high risks to a
woman's health and fertility
that they are used only in ex-
tremely rare circumstances.
And because abortions necessar-
ily involve the death of the fetus,
virtually every method of vagi-
nal abortion - i.e., virtually
every method by which almost
all abortions are performed -
potentially falls within the ban's
vast sweep.
The amended version of the
proposed congressional ban,
H.R. 1122, was touted as nar-
rowing the all-encompassing
scope of its initial incarnation.
However, courts addressing
challenges to comparable state
bans have concluded that the
revisions do not cure the consti-
tutional problems.15 Recall that
Nexus
the amended bill retains its
predecessor's core definition of
the banned abortions: any in
which the physician "partially
vaginally delivers a living fetus
before killing the fetus and
completing the delivery," but it
then defines that phrase to
mean "deliberately and inten-
tionally delivers into the vagina
a living fetus, or a substantial
portion thereof, for the purpose
of performing a procedure the
physician knows will kill the
fetus, and kills the fetus."
This revised definition con-
tinues to use non medical terms.
And, it continues to threaten the
safest and most common meth-
ods of abortion. Once again, the
definition focuses on delivery
into the vagina. The purported
limitation to only those proce-
dures that have a particular
purpose - namely, to "kill the
fetus" - at most immunizes
obstetrical procedures, per-
formed out of necessity when an
intended childbirth goes awry.
It offers no comfort to physicians
performing abortions or to
women seeking them. Finally,
the addition of the vague term
"substantial portion" does noth-




respond to these persistent
definitional problems in two
inconsistent ways. On the one
hand, such advocates insist that
they know what the bans pro-
hibit. On the other hand, when
pressed, these same advocates
have been unwilling to identify
precisely which medical proce-
dures are banned. For example,
Representative Charles Canady,
a sponsor of the federal ban,
signed a letter to House col-
leagues declaring that "H.R.
1833 does not ban [only] 'D&X'
[dilation and extraction] or
'Brain Suction' abortions....
The ban would have the effect of
prohibiting any abortion in
which a child was partially
delivered and then killed - no
matter what the abortionist
decides to call his particular
technique.' 1 6 The bans' propo-
nents frequently have refused to
adopt a narrower medical defini-
tion on the ground that to do so
would enable physicians to
evade the bans by modifying
their practices. 7
In short, the broad sweep of
the bans' language effectuates
the proponents' goal: to outlaw
not a single, specific procedure,
but rather any of a number of
procedures a physician might
use. In other words, the amor-
phous language is not the acci-
dental product of poor drafts-
manship, but instead precisely
reflects and promotes its propo-
nents' goal of criminalizing and
deterring as many abortions as
possible. That was the conclu-
sion of the Alaska Superior
Court in invalidating that
state's "partial-birth abortion"
ban. The court explained that
Strossen and Borgmann
since the legislature had en-
acted the ban "with knowledge
of the legal defects, it seems
more likely than not that the
unstated purpose of the Act was
to cloud the scope of abortion
procedures, i.e., to restrict abor-
tion in general." 8

























in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion."2 °
The "partial-birth abortion"
bans impose not only a substan-
tial obstacle, but far worse, an
absolute barrier to many abor-
tions that are now safe and
legal. This is so both because of
the broad range of procedures
the bans encompass and because
"The partial-birth
abortion bans








ing the ultimate decision, in
accordance with her own con-
science, to have an abortion of a
nonviable fetus.19 Under Casey, a
pre-viability abortion restriction
is unconstitutional if it places an
"undue burden" on a woman's
right to choose abortion - that
is, if it "has the purpose or effect
























prohibit abortions as early as
the first trimester.22
This conclusion was reached,
for example, by a federal district
court in Illinois, which struck
down that state's ban. After
hearing extensive medical
testimony, the court held that
the state statute imposed "an
undue burden on a woman s
Nexus
constitutional right to choose to
terminate her pregnancy before
viability" because "virtually
every abortion procedure" could
violate the ban,23 including "the
most common and safest abor-
tion procedures... without




The Due Process Clause
prohibits any law so vague that
persons "of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its
application."25 Vague laws
violate the due process guaran-
tee in two ways. First, they fail
to provide the persons regulated
with a "reasonable opportunity
to know what conduct is prohib-
ited so that [they] may act ac-
cordingly. '26 The "partial-birth
abortion" bans, with their vague
and non medical terms, require
doctors to guess whether per-
forming a procedure that is
medically appropriate neverthe-
less falls within the ban's pro-
scriptions. Dr. Timothy R.B.
Johnson, a court-appointed
expert for a federal district court
in Michigan, testified that it was
"not entirely clear to [him] as a
physician" what the definition of
"partial-birth abortion" in that
state's ban meant, nor was it
clear to him which procedures
the statute encompassed.
Based on this and other testi-
mony, the court concluded that
physicians "simply cannot know
with any degree of confidence"
which abortion methods the ban
prohibits, and it therefore en-
joined the ban.28
"Partial-birth abortion"
bans also embody the second
due process vice of unconstitu-
tionally vague laws: by failing to
provide explicit standards for
those who apply them, the bans
"impermissibly delegate basic
policy matters to policemen,
judges, and juries for resolution
on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dan-
gers of arbitrary and discrimina-
to--y application."2 1' In striking
down Alaska's ban, the Alaska
Superior Court stressed this
defect, noting that "[t]he broad
sweep of the language involved
could allow broad enforcement
against most, if not all, abortion
procedures depending on the







By prohibiting the safest and
most common abortion methods,
"partial-birth abortion" bans
compromise women's health and
drastically limit physicians'
discretion to choose the most
medically appropriate abortion
method for their patients. If
doctors stopped providing all
Strossen and Borgmann
abortion services that are poten- Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
tially covered by a ban, abor- the Supreme Court began its
tions could become virtually review of a multi-pronged abor-
impossible to obtain. In Wiscon- tion statute by examining the
sin, where the ban threatened adequacy of the medical emer-
physicians with sentences as gency exception, "[b]ecause it is
severe as life imprisonment, central to the operation of vari-
doctors ceased performing any ous other requirements." 5 The
abortions for a week after the Court stressed that if it deter-
law went into effect. Doctors did mined this exception to be
not resume abortion services insifficiently protective of a
until they received assurances woman's health, it "would be
from prosecutors that, pending required to invalidate" all of
resolution of the lawsuit chal- Pennsylvania's abortion restric-
lenging the ban's constitutional- tions because "the essential
ity, they would not be prosecuted holding of Roe forbids a State
for performing first-trimester from interfering with a woman's
abortions.' choice to undergo an abortion
Courts have recognized the procedure if continuing her
extent to which "partial-birth pregnancy would constitute a
abortion" bans endanger threat to her health."36
women's lives and health. A Yet nearly all of the "partial-
federal court in Arkansas en- birth abortion" bans enacted in
joined that state's ban after the states, as well as both ver-
finding that it would have the sions of the federal bill, apply to
effect of denying women "appro- procedures performed through-
priate medical care."32 Simi- out pregnancy and contain no
larly, the court that enjoined health exception whatsoever.
Montana's ban found it would Thus, they will bar some women
"increase the amount of risk and from obtaining an abortion,
pain that must be suffered by even when continuing the preg-
the woman."33  nancy seriously threatens their
Moreover, most of the pro- health. As courts have held, this
posed bans fail to provide ad- feature alone is constitutionally
equate exceptions to protect a damning.
woman's life or health. Those Even if the bans succeeded in
omissions alone render the bans targeting a single procedure, the
unconstitutional. The govern- lack of a health exception would
ment may never, even in the constitute a fatal constitutional
latest stages of pregnancy, flaw. Since the medical appro-
prohibit abortions that are priateness of any safe abortion
necessary to preserve women's procedure will depend on factors
lives or health. 4 Indeed, in unique to the circumstances of
Nexus
each patient - such as her
medical condition, the stage of
gestation, and the expertise of
the physician performing the
procedure - there will always
be some women for whom the
banned procedure is the safest.
By removing a safe medical
procedure from the physician's
array of options without provid-
ing a health exception, the bans
irreparably harm some women
by forcing them to undergo
other procedures that put them
at greater risk.
While it's bad - and uncon-
stitutional - enough that "par-
tial-birth abortion" bans do not
protect women's health, worse
yet, they fail to afford adequate
protection even when a woman's
very life is at stake. For ex-
ample, the federal bill that just
narrowly escaped enactment
permits a physician to perform a
banned procedure only when it
is "necessary to save the life of a
mother whose life is endangered
by a physical disorder, illness, or
injury.
'38
This statutory language is
insufficiently protective of
women's lives in a couple of
respects.3 9 First, by enumerating
certain life-endangering circum-
stances under which the proce-
dure could be carried out, the
lawmakers apparently intended
to exclude others. But at no
stage in pregnancy may the
government pick and choose
among various life-threatening
conditions from which it is
willing to protect women.4 °
Moreover, because the ban is
lifted only when "a partial birth
abortion ... is necessary" to save
the woman's life, the physician
must first resort to any other
procedure - such as hystero-
tomy or hysterectomy - that
would save her life, even if that
method poses grave risks to her
health and fertility.41 Yet the
Supreme Court consistently has
barred the government from
subordinating a woman's health
to its interest in fetal welfare. In
Colautti v. Franklin, for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court
struck down a requirement that
physicians "employ the abortion
technique best suited to fetal
survival 'so long as a different
technique would not be neces-
sary in order to preserve the life
or health of the mother.' ,,42 In so
ruling, the Court noted that "the
word 'necessary' suggests that a
particular technique must be
indispensable to the woman's life
or health - not merely desir-
able - before it may be
adopted. '43 Consequently, the
Court found, "it is uncertain
whether the statute permits the
physician to consider his duty to
the patient to be paramount to
his duty to the fetus."44 The
Court held that this ambiguity
was constitutionally unaccept-
able. Likewise, "partial-birth
abortion" bans suffer from the
same constitutional infirmity, in
failing to'give physicians unam-
biguous authority to follow the
course of action that best pro-





As previously noted, "par-
tial-birth abortion" bans autho-
rize the "father" and "maternal
grandparents" of a fetus to sue
physicians for violating the
bans. Therefore, the bans effec-
tively require physicians to
obtain the consent of those third
parties before performing any
abortions that might violate the
ban. And since the bans sweep
so broadly, doctors would need to
obtain this consent before utiliz-
ing even the most common
abortion procedures. The civil
liability provision thus grants
husbands and parents veto
power over the woman's abortion
decision, which is blatantly
unconstitutional.
Striking down a provision
that required spousal notifica-
tion - in contrast with consent
- the Casey Court held that no
husband has the "right to re-
quire a [woman] to advise him
before she exercises her personal
choices."45 The Court declared
that such a requirement "em-
bodies a view of marriage...
repugnant to our present under-
standing of marriage and of the
nature of the rights secured by
the Constitution. Women do not
lose their constitutionally pro-
tected liberty when they
marry."46 Accordingly, a provi-
and Borgmann
sion that effectively forces a
woman to obtain her husband's
consent before she can have an
abortion is an even worse viola-
tion of these same principles.
For this reason, a federal district
court in Arizona invalidated the
provision of that state's "par-
tial-birth abortion" ban autho-
rizing "fathers" to bring civil
actions.47
The bans' parental consent
requirement is equally unconsti-
tutional. No court has ever
before considered, let alone
upheld, a parental consent
requirement attached to a ban
on certain abortion procedures,
and it is difficult to discern what
state interest would support
such a requirement. As to abor-
tion in general, the Supreme
Court has held that the govern-
ment may require a minor to
obtain parental consent only if it
also provides a confidential and
expeditious "judicial bypass"
procedure - i.e., a procedure
whereby a judge may determine
either (1) that the particular
minor is sufficiently mature to
make her own decision to have
an abortion, or (2) that an abor-
tion is in her best interest.48 But
no such bypass is afforded by the
"partial-birth abortion" bans,
therefore constituting yet an-
other ground on which they
have been held unconstitu-
tional.49
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E. No Legitimate State
Interest
In enacting abortion restric-
tions, the government must of
course seek to further legitimate
ends. While the Casey Court
recognized that "the State has
legitimate interests in the
health of the woman and in
protecting the potential life
within her, "50 so-called "partial-
birth abortion" bans serve
neither of these interests. To
the contrary, far from promoting
women's health, these bans have
the opposite effect.
Nor do the bans promote a
legitimate state interest in
potential life. The Casey Court
held that "measures designed to
advance this interest [in poten-
tial life] will not be invalidated
as long as their purpose is to
persuade the woman to choose
childbirth over abortion" and
the measures do not impose "an
undue burden on the right."5 In
contrast, a restriction that is
"designed to strike at the right
itself"52 does not permissibly
further the state's interest in
potential life. By sweeping so
broadly as to erect a virtual
barrier to the safest and most
common methods of abortion,
"partial-birth abortion" bans
cross the divide between permis-
sible persuasion and prohibited
coercion. 53 This thwarting of
women's attempts to obtain safe
abortions is wholly at odds with
the Casey Court's insistence that
the state may not "deprive
women of the ultimate decision"
to end their pregnancies.54 Even
if the bans could be rewritten to
target a single procedure, they
still would not further the inter-
est in potential life. They would
merely bar women who had
already decided to end their
pregnancies from utilizing one
method for doing so. Without
advancing the state's interest in
potential life one whit, such a
bar would serve only to reduce
safe medical options for women.





The practice of medicine is
not stagnant. We know and
expect that physicians continu-
ally question existing methods
and experiment with new tech-
niques or with variants of recog-
nized techniques. This process
of evaluation and experimenta-
tion ensures the development of
ever safer and more effective
medical procedures. Abortion
practice is no exception. Meth-
ods of abortion that were once
considered the standard of care
have been virtually abandoned,
while other methods once
thought experimental are now
the most common.
For example, until the
middle of this century, the most
widely used abortion method
was a procedure called hystero-
Strossen and Borgmann
tomy. This is essentially a pre- consistently has struck down
term caesarean section, but it is abortion restrictions that fail to
significantly more dangerous. account for ongoing develop-
These dangers were known even ments in the standard of medical
at the time that hysterotomy care. In Planned Parenthood v.
was the most common abortion Danforth, for example, the Court
technique. However, "so long as struck down a ban on the use of
the whole subject of abortion was saline amniocentesis as an
regarded as quasi-legal and abortion method. The ban flew
disreputable,... innovatory in the face of accepted medical
practitioners were deterred from practice, since at that time
publishing their results and saline amniocentesis was em-
technical progress was inhib- ployed in "a substantial majority
ited."55 In the late 1960s and .. . of all post-first-trimester
early 1970s, the legalization of abortions."59 The Court further
abortion led to more widespread noted that the ban "appear[ed]
experimentation with alterna- to include within its proscription
tive techniques, experimenta- the intra-amniotic injection of
tion that continues to this day. prostaglandin... and other
Consequently, hysterotomy has methods that may be developed
been all but abandoned as an in the future and that may
appropriate method for termi- prove highly effective and com-
566nating pregnancy. 56 pletely safe."6 ° Indeed, not only
Two strands of Supreme did prostaglandin come to re-
Court abortion jurisprudence place saline as the favored
acknowledge the importance and substance for "abortions by
value of medical innovation and induction," but furthermore,
progress. First, the Court re- inductions themselves were later
peatedly has stressed the essen- largely replaced by the newer,
tial role of the doctor's discretion often safer dilation and evacua-
in abortion practice, invalidat- tion (D&E) method of abortion. 1
ing restrictions that circum- Similarly, in City ofAkron v.
scribed such discretion as violat- Akron Reproductive Health
ing a woman's reproductive Center, the Supreme Court
freedom. In Colautti v. struck down a requirement that
Franklin, the Court reaffirmed all second-trimester abortions be
this principle, noting that its performed in a hospital. The
decision in Roe v. Wade accorded Court recognized that the D&E
great weight to "the central role method had become accepted as
of the physician.., in determin- the safest method of performing
ing how any abortion was to be most post-first-trimester abor-
carried out."5  tions, and that D&Es could be
Second, the Supreme Court performed safely on an out-
Nexus
patient basis,62 The Court
noted that both the American
Public Health Association and
the American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists had
"abandoned [their] prior
recommendation[s] of hospital-
ization for all second-trimester
abortions."63 The Court con-
cluded that" 'present medical
knowledge' convincingly under-
cuts Akron's justification" for the
requirement.64
"Partial-birth abortion"
bans are frequently - and
erroneously - thought to pro-
hibit only the abortion proce-
dure known as either "intact
dilation and evacuation" (intact
D&E) or "dilation and extrac-
tion" (D&X). While definitions of
intact D&E/D&X vary, there is
general consensus that it is not
really a distinct procedure, but
rather, a variant of the D&E
method of abortion, which is
used in more than 96 percent of
all post-first-trimester abor-
tions.65 Many physicians be-
lieve, and several federal courts
have found, that intact D&E/
D&X has specific safety advan-
tages and may be the safest
procedure in certain circum-
stances.66 For example, a federal
district court in Nebraska noted
that "the D&X procedure has
been shown by medical evidence
to be the safest procedure used
by mainstream medical profes-
sionals.., in certain circum-
stances."67 A federal district
court in Michigan observed that
six board-certified doctors all
agree that the intact D&E/D&X
procedure "reduce[s] risks associ-
ated with conventional D&Es."68
Even if a law prohibited only
the performance of intact D&Es/
D&Xs, it would still cripple the
ability of doctors to treat their
patients according to their own
best medical judgment. A physi-
cian would be unable to use the
procedure that might be the
safest for a particular patient in
the given circumstances. Yet,
the Supreme Court repeatedly
has held that a woman's health
may never be compromised in
order to promote a state interest
in fetal welfare.6 9 A woman is
constitutionally entitled to the
specific abortion procedure that
her physician deems the safest
for her. If that procedure is
outlawed, it is legally irrelevant
that other, generally safe,
procedures might still be avail-
able options. For this reason, it
would be unconstitutional even
to ban procedures such as the
rarely used hysterotomy; al-
though the procedure is seldom
warranted, there are rare cir-
cumstances in which it would be
the safest option.7 0 For any
woman facing such circum-
stances, a ban would unconstitu-
tionally "force [her] and her
physician to terminate her
pregnancy by methods more
dangerous to her health than
the method outlawed.7
Courts should not sanction a
ban on a single abortion proce-
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dure for the additional reason
that this would set a dangerous
precedent of approving legisla-
tive micro-management of
medical practice. Such interfer-
ence would inevitably chill the
experimentation and free flow of
ideas necessary for medical
innovation and progress. It is
telling to recall how the "par-
tial-birth abortion" campaign
arose: it was a political response
to a physician's scholarly pre-
sentation of a technique he
believed represented an advance
in safe abortion practice. In the
already chilly climate for repro-
ductive freedom, in which ever-
declining numbers of doctors are
willing to perform abortions, one
can only imagine the deep-
freeze impact this development
is likely to have on other doctors'
willingness to present their own
ideas or to learn new abortion





banned. The non medical termi-
nology and vague definitions
contained in the so-called "par-
tial-birth abortion" bans in fact
render them virtual abortion
bans, prohibiting the safest and
most common abortion proce-
dures used throughout preg-
nancy. As such, these laws
cannot survive constitutional
scrutiny. But even if the laws
could be revised to prohibit a
single specific procedure, they
would still be unconstitutional,
not advancing the government's
interest in potential life, and
undermining its interest in the
actual lives and health of preg-
nant women.
Notes
Shortly before this article went
to press, on October 23, 1998, a
Buffalo-area doctor who per-
formed abortions, Dr. Barnett A.
Slepian, was shot to death,
apparently by a sniper who lay
in wait outside his home. This
tragic murder illustrates the
extreme lengths to which some
"pro-life" activists will go in
pursuit of their ultimate goal --
criminalizing and deterring as
many abortions as possible.
"Partial-birth abortion" bans
serve the same goal, contribut-
ing to the increasingly chilly,
hostile environment faced by all
abortion providers. Therefore,
we dedicate this article to the
memory of Dr. Slepian and the
other courageous, compassion-
ate women and men who have
sacrificed their lives -- all too
literally -- to the cause of pre-
serving womens' health and
freedom.
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